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Abstract—System reliability modelling needs a large amount of 
data to estimate the parameters. In addition, reliability 
estimation is associated with uncertainty. This paper aims to 
propose a new method to evaluate the failure behavior and 
reliability of a large system using failure modes, effects and 
criticality analysis (FMECA). Therefore, qualitative data based 
on the judgment of experts is used when data is not sufficient. 
The subjective data of failure modes and causes has been 
aggregated through the system to develop an overall failure index 
(OFI). This index not only represents the system reliability 
behavior but also prioritizes corrective actions based on 
improvements in system failure. In addition, two optimization 
models are presented to select optimal actions subject to budget 
constraint. The associated costs of each corrective action are 
considered in risk evaluation. Finally, a case study of a 
manufacturing line is introduced to verify the applicability of the 
proposed method in industrial environments. The proposed 
method is compared with conventional FMECA approach. It is 
shown that the proposed method has a better performance in risk 
assessment. A sensitivity analysis is provided on the budget 
amount and the results are discussed. 
 
Index Terms—Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis; 
Qualitative data; Uncertainty; Reliability modelling; Universal 
generating function; Overall failure index; Genetic algorithm.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
YSTEM evaluation is important to provide a systematic 
view for engineers in order to identify the problems and 
improve them. Reliability has been increasingly considered in 
system analysis to reduce system failure [1]. Many researchers 
have done investigation on developing system reliability 
models to assess and optimize system behavior and safety via 
components’ working probability and performance [2-7]. The 
exact value of the probability is not easily accessible [8, 9]. To 
estimate these parameters by statistical models, large amount 
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of data is needed. In addition to this, the estimation is 
associated with uncertainty [10]. Therefore, subjective 
estimates of parameters which are based on the judgment of 
experts and engineers could be useful in the situation with the 
lack of sufficient data [11]. 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative 
risk assessment method which makes possible using linguistic 
expressions when historical data and statistics are not 
available [12]. It aims to identify potential failure modes, 
investigate their effect on the system, specify the causes, 
prioritize them, and allocate corrective actions to the crucial 
ones. A failure mode is a situation in which an asset or a 
component cannot work properly [13]. In order to ranking 
failure modes, each possible failure mode is valued by three 
parameters as severity (S), occurrence likelihood (O), and 
detection difficulty (D) to obtain a risk priority number (RPN). 
These parameters are rated among 1 to 10 to show how the 
failure mode is severely influenced the system, how often it 
happens, and how much it is detectable before having 
consequences, respectively. The RPN value is calculated 
through multiplication of the parameters which is 
RPN=S×O×D. The company can consider a strategy to 
implement improvement actions based on the highest RPN 
value, or a predefined threshold to remove or mitigate cause of 
failures [14]. Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) is an extended version of FMEA which is combined 
with criticality analysis (CA) procedure [15]. 
FMECA is a bottom-up approach which consists of a 
breakdown structure for reliability examination of the final 
item of the system based on the failure causes [12, 16]. System 
definition and modelling is usually used to understand the 
system’s operation to determine failure modes and their cause 
and effects [15]. Sharma et al. [17] utilized fault tree and 
petrinet models to determine the relationship between failure 
modes and subsystems. Boolean representation method 
(BRM) is integrated with FMECA in [18] to model cause and 
effect relationships. A prioritization method is proposed for 
failures in system FMEA to consider relations between 
components by decision making trial and evaluation 
laboratory technique (DEMATEL) [19]. Chen [20] used a 
hierarchical FMEA system structure to analyze a company 
from bottom (cause of failure) to top (system). These system 
models try to find the RPN value of each failure mode to rank 
them through the system so that the system reliability will be 
improved by applying corrective actions on critical failure 
causes. However in the current study, we are going to find a 
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failure index for the whole system based on FMECA by 
reliability block diagram (RBD) and universal generating 
function (UGF). This model can contain the data of failure 
modes, components, and subsystems and the interaction 
among them through a large scale system. Also, this approach 
is useful for decision makers to find the priority of each 
improvement action based on their effect on the whole system.  
One of the main criticisms of the RPN method is that the 
associated cost is not considered in analysis. Some studies 
have been done to point out cost in FMEA. The cost caused by 
failure is used as severity, occurrence and detection 
parameters are expressed by probabilities to establish the 
expected cost by [21]. Bevilacqua et al. [22] employed 
maintenance cost in calculation of priority number in FMECA. 
A Life Cost-Based FMEA is introduced in [23] for comparing 
and selecting design alternatives. Carmignani [12] considered 
the cost of corrective actions in applying improvement for 
failure modes. A fuzzy cost-based FMEA is integrated with 
grey rational analysis (GRA) and profitability theory to 
prioritize service failures [24]. In this paper, the associated 
uncertainty with reliability evaluation is quantified by 
subjective estimates of FMECA approach. Therefore, the 
failure behavior of the system can be modelled when there is 
lack of sufficient data. A systematic approach is proposed to 
estimate system reliability and failure using qualitative data. 
As a result, the proposed approach can assess the potential 
corrective actions of the industrial system. Furthermore, two 
optimization models are developed to find the optimal 
combination of actions via considering corrective actions’ 
cost. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The second 
section presents the proposed method through some 
subsections such as systematic view, system behavior 
modelling, prioritization, and optimal selection. The third 
section illustrates the proposed methods via a case study of a 
manufacturing line. The concluding remarks are mentioned in 
the last section. 
II. PROPOSED METHOD 
In this section, the proposed method is presented for system 
reliability modelling via FMECA, mathematical formulation 
and optimization model in the following subsections. At first, 
a systematic view is introduced for failure modes in an 
FMECA approach. Then, the failure behavior of the system is 
assessed by UGF approach to reach a failure index. After that, 
the system failure index is utilized to rank the corrective 
actions in terms of providing reduction in system risk. Finally, 
an optimization model is developed to select corrective actions 
economically. 
A. Systematic view 
A qualitative analysis of the system is carried out using the 
integration of hierarchical algorithm and block diagram to 
provide a system sketch based on FMECA which is shown in 
Figure 1. At the bottom of the framework, there are failures 
and their causes. Each failure mode may consist of some 
failure causes. Therefore, the failures are analyzed based on 
the severity of the effect of the failure mode on the next higher 
level or the system, the occurrence probability of the failure 
cause, and the detection capability for each failure cause. In 
fact, occurrence and detection parameters are obtained from 
causes, and severity is for failure mode [25, 26]. The higher 
level shows that each component includes some failure modes 
which lead the component to fail. Based on the system 
configuration, components and subsystems can form the 
system RBD.  
Since a component will fail when a failure mode occurs, 
each component is a series system in which failure modes are 
elements. Therefore, different levels (states) of failure would 
be imposed to each component based on the seriousness of the 
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Figure 1. System structure 
Hydraulic oil tank 
No# Rate Severity 
1 0.443 4 
2 0.103 3 
3 0.059 3 
4 0.395 4 
Auxiliary 
No# Rate Severity 
1 0.284 3 
2 0.011 3 
3 0.085 3 
4 0.566 4 
5 0.011 3 
6 0.043 2 
Control 
No# Rate Severity 
1 0.015 2 
2 0.310 4 
3 0.365 3 
4 0.155 1 
5 0.155 1 
Protection 
No# Rate Severity 
1 0.132 3 
2 0.066 1 
3 0.530 4 
4 0.046 1 
5 0.066 1 
6 0.066 1 
7 0.066 1 
8 0.028 1 
Hydraulic servo 
transmission 
No# Rate Severity 
1 0.094 1 
2 0.522 4 
3 0.013 1 
4 0.311 1 
5 0.026 1 
6 0.026 3 
7 0.008 1 
Figure 2. HHTS configuration 
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happened failure mode. If several failure modes occur at the 
same time, the maximum of the severity the occurred failure 
modes represents the failure level of the component at that 
time. This concept is used in the next section to find the 
overall failure index (OFI). 
B. System behavior modelling 
In this section, the FMECA information of the failure 
modes is aggregated through the system using the UGF 
approach. Therefore, the uncertainties are propagated across 
the whole system [27]. To make an illustration, an example is 
adapted from [18] which is exhibited in Figure 2. The example 
is a hydraulic hoisting transmission system (HHTS) of a 
marine crane with five subsystems in which failure modes are 
defined. Each failure mode is analyzed by occurrence rate and 
severity. In some work on FMECA (or FMEA), the detection 
parameter does not take into account. Kmenta et al. [28] 
suggest eliminating detection in priority evaluation of failure 
modes. In [29], the importance weight of detection has been 
found one-third of severity and half of occurrence through pair 
wise comparison of analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Also, 
occurrence level and severity classification are used in the 
application of FMECA for product traceability in food 
industry [30]. The critical processes are selected for 
implementing statistical process control (SPC) via occurrence 
likelihood and severity of their failure modes [31]. In fuzzy 
risk analysis, two factors of severity and failure probability are 
usually used to evaluate the risk of components [32].  
 In UGF, the probability distribution of a variable (X) is 
discretely represented via a u-function (Eq. 1) in which p is 
the probability that the variable is in state j, x  is its 
corresponding value, and k  shows the number of different 
states of the variable. The u-function presents a polynomial 
structure of a probability distribution. This transformation 
provides an opportunity to use the properties of polynomial 
expressions in order to find the probability distribution of a 
function of variables. It also facilitates to model a system with 
multi-level components [33, 34]. 
u	
z = ∑ p ∙ z		               (1) 
According to this, we aim to create a u-function for each 
failure mode. Each failure mode is considered as a binary 
phenomenon which consists of two possible reliability levels. 
These levels are failure and functioning states. Therefore, each 
failure mode follows the binomial (Bernoulli) distribution. 
Where, occurrence rate represents the probability that a failure 
mode occurs with specified severity degree. According to this 
statistical property, the probability distribution of each failure 
mode can be presented by u-function as Eq. 2. 
u	
z = ∑ Or ∙ z	             (2) 
where u	
z is the u-function of failure mode number i in 
subsystem h, Or and S are respectively the occurrence rate 
and severity of the failure mode in state j. Since there are just 
two states as 0 stands for failure and 1 stands for working state 
(no failure), Or = 1 − Or. Also, severity of the state with 
no failure (S) is zero. Consequently, the u-function of the 
failure mode number 1 in subsystem 1 ( u
z ) is 
demonstrated as 0.443×z4+0.557×z0. 
Based on the failure modes’ u-functions, the behavior 
distribution of the higher levels such as components, 
subsystems, and system can be obtained. In this regard, all 
possible combinations should be considered to generate the u-
function of the higher level item via the ⊗  operator. For the 
example, u-function of each subsystem can be computed as 
Eq. 3.  
u
z =⊗!" #u
z, u%
z, … , u'
z(           (3) 
where u
z  is the u-function of subsystem h, n*  is the 
number of failures in the subsystem, and ⊗!"  denotes the 
maximum severity of the occurred failures in each 
combination is considered. A Matlab programming is 
developed to acquire the probability distribution of severity 
levels of subsystems. The results are exhibited in Table 1. 
TABLE 1.  
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSYSTEMS 
 As can be seen, the binary-state failures lead to multi-state 
subsystems. The u-function of subsystems can be obtained 
based on the probability distribution outcomes. For example, 
the u-function of subsystem 1 ( u
z ) is as 
0.663×z4+0.0525×z3+0.2844×z0. Similarly, the u-function of 
the system is figured based on the subsystems’ u-functions 
through considering all possible combinations of severity 
levels of subsystems. Since the subsystems of the example are 
connected as a series system, the u-function of the whole 
system is obtained as Eq. 4.  
U
z =⊗!" ,u
z, u%
z, … , u'
z-           (4) 
where U
z  is the u-function of the system, and n  is the 
number subsystems. The severity levels of the system which 
are calculated through Matlab software are shown in Table 2. 
These levels and the corresponding probabilities are reached 
by analyzing 960 different combinations (3×4×5×4×4). 
TABLE 2.  
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF THE SYSTEM 
Severity level 0 1 2 3 4 
probability 0.0019 0.0043 0.0004 0.0161 0.9773 
According to Table 2, the u-function of the system is as 
0.9773×z4+0.0161×z3+0.0004×z2+0.0043×z1+0.0019×z0. An 
expected value for each u-function can be extracted using the 
first derivative at z equal to 1. As a result, a derivation is to be 
done on the system’s u-function to find the expected value of 
the system in terms of failure as OFI (Eq. 5). 
OFI = 001U
z			at	z = 1             (5) 
Subsequently, the OFI for the example is computed which 
is 3.9627. The u-function represents how the system tends to 
be failed, and the OFI gives a scale to measure this failure 
Subsystem 1 Severity level 0 3 4   probability 0.2844 0.0525 0.663   
Subsystem 2 Severity level 0 2 3 4  probability 0.2662 0.012 0.1559 0.566  
Subsystem 3 Severity level 0 1 2 3 4 probability 0.3082 0.1234 0.0066 0.2518 0.31 
Subsystem 4 Severity level 0 1 3 4  probability 0.2879 0.1201 0.062 0.53  
Subsystem 5 Severity level 0 1 3 4  probability 0.2772 0.1884 0.0124 0.522  
1551-3203 (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/TII.2015.2431224, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
 
behavior. 
C. Prioritization 
This section is allocated to use the OFI in ranking corrective 
actions based on their improvement on the whole system 
failure behavior. Corrective actions are usually applied on to 
decrease the occurring rate or increase the detectability of the 
causes. Therefore, a corrective action controls the related 
cause in terms of occurrence or detection. Then, it would lead 
to mitigate the risk of each failure mode. Successively, it 
effects on the items in the higher levels as component, 
subsystem, and system according to Figure 1. As a result, the 
OFI would be reduced in the response of implementing the 
corrective action. This reduction can be used as criteria to 
prioritize the corrective actions as Eq. 6. 
∆OFI" = OFI67889:; − OFI"             (6) 
where OFI" is the estimated OFI for the time the corrective 
action a is applied on the corresponded failure cause, and 
∆OFI" measures the reduction that is carried out on the current 
situation of the system (OFI67889:;) by action a. The higher the 
∆OFI, the higher the priority of corrective action to apply. 
Consequently, the corrective actions which have more impact 
on the improvement on the system behavior can be nominated.  
An example is developed for illustration. Given an action is 
applied on failure 4 in subsystem 2 (F<=) which improves the 
occurrence rate from 0.566 to 0.2. It changes the OFI to 
3.9312, so that the ∆OFI of the action is 0.0315. Also, the 
occurrence rate of the failure F><  is improved by another 
action from 0.53 to 0.2. As a result, the OFI is promoted to 
3.9365 which the reduction of 0.0262 has been obtained. 
According to these results, the action for F<=  is in higher 
priority for implementation because of the higher 
improvement on system failure. In addition, it can be seen that 
two failures with same severity level and almost the same 
improvement in occurrence rate can have different impacts on 
the system. It shows the existence of different importance 
weight for the failures. In conventional RPN method, failure 
modes are ranked based on their risk and corrective actions are 
allocated to the more critical modes. However, the 
effectiveness of the allocated actions is not considered. In the 
proposed method, the most effective actions are selected to 
reduce the system failure. 
D. Optimal selection 
Due to the limited budget, all corrective actions cannot be 
allocated to all failure causes. Therefore, a balance should be 
provided between actions’ costs and their equivalent 
improvement. As a result, an algorithm has been developed to 
select optimal corrective actions using an optimization model. 
The algorithm aims to maximize the resulted reduction in OFI 
by corrective actions in terms of the budget constraint. The 
linear mathematical formulation of the optimization model is 
as Eq. 7. 
Max	 ∑ ∆OFI" ∙ x"@"   
∑ C" ∙ x"@" ≤ B              (7) 
where x" is a Boolean variable that is 1 if action a is applied 
otherwise is 0, N  is the number of failure causes which is 
equal to ∑ n*:* , C" is the cost associated with the action, and 
B is the available budget.  
In the abovementioned model, the effect of several 
corrective actions on OFI is assumed to be linear. However, 
there is a nonlinear relationship between OFI reduction and 
number of applied actions. For example, if two mentioned 
actions in previous section apply concurrently, the reduction in 
OFI is 0.0798; while it is not the summation of the individual 
∆OFI (0.0315 and 0.0262). As a result, the optimization model 
is changed to a modelling with nonlinear objective function 
and still a linear constraint as Eq. 8. 
Max	∆OFI
X  
∑ C" ∙ x"@" ≤ B              (8) 
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where X is a vector of Boolean variable as X = 
x, x=, … , x@. 
Solving this model will give how many actions and which of 
them are optimal to apply. 
To sum up, the steps in the proposed method to reach the 
final decision are brought as follows: 
• Develop block diagram and hierarchical algorithm to 
break down the system into failure modes and causes 
• Assess the failure modes by FMECA parameters 
• Allocate corrective actions to the causes, and estimate 
their improved parameters 
• Aggregate the failure modes based on system structure to 
reach OFI 
• Calculate the OFI for each corrective action based on the 
estimated parameters 
• Rank corrective actions in terms of the difference they 
make on OFI (∆OFI) 
• Select the optimal set of corrective actions subject to 
budget constraint 
III. CASE STUDY 
The proposed method is implemented in a case study to 
validate its applicability. In this case study, three parameters 
of the RPN method have been employed. The considered case 
is a manufacturing line of car battery factory. The processes of 
the manufacturing line are shown in Figure 3. After this line, 
the battery shells go to another manufacturing line for filling 
electrolyte inside.  
In fact, a Process FMEA (PFMEA) has been done on the 
manufacturing processes. The manufacturing line consists of 
six processes such as 1) packaging, 2) plate welding, 3) 
punching, 4) inserting in cell, 5) cellular welding, 6) housing. 
Each process is considered as a block (component), therefore, 
the block diagram of the manufacturing line is drawn as 
Figure 4. 
Failure modes of each process have been identified. A root 
cause analysis (RCA) is done to find the cause of failure 
occurrence, and suggest a corrective action for each failure 
cause. Also, failure modes are evaluated based on severity, 
occurrence, and detection parameters. All parameters are 
individually rated from 1 to 10 based on the standard tables of 
FMECA [35]. The historical data of each failure is 
investigated to measure the occurrence rate. For occurrence, 
numbers 10 and 1 denote that the possibility of failure 
incidence is extremely high and nearly impossible 
respectively. However, the severity and detection parameters 
have been rated using experts’ judgements. For severity, if the 
failure mode has hazardous consequence for the whole system 
is rated as 10, and if there is no effect is rated as 1. For 
detection, number 10 shows that the control system does not 
detect the potential cause of the failure before occurrence, and 
number 1 shows the cause is easily detectable. The result of 
FMECA application is presented in Table 3. It should be 
mentioned that Exp O and Exp D are the expected values of 
occurrence and detection after applying the corrective actions 
respectively, and action cost denotes the associated cost of the 
corrective action. 
TABLE 3.  
FMECA FOR THE MANUFACTURING LINE 
In this case, we have three parameters of FMECA in the 
scale of 1-10. Therefore, some modifications should be taken 
in order to developing u-function. First of all, the occurrence 
rate in an interval of [0,1] is needed to use in UGF approach. 
To reach this goal, the frequency factor which is proposed in 
[12] as the percentage of occurring a failure cause can be 
employed as the occurrence rate. However in our case, since 
we tend to keep FMECA’s properties, the occurrence rate is 
defined through dividing occurrence value (O) over 10 (i.e. if 
the occurrence value is 5, the occurrence rate would be 0.5). 
Secondly, the detection value should be involved in u-function 
structure. According to these modifications, the u-function of 
each failure mode is constructed as Eq. 9. 
u	
z = ∑ Or ∙ z
	×F	              (9) 
where D is the detection of failure mode i in state j which it is 
zero in state of no failure. Accordingly, the calculation of OFI 
Sys # Failure mode Code S cause O D Action a Exp O 
Exp 
D 
Actio
n cost 
Su
bs
ys
te
m
 
1 
1 
Plate grinding H 7 No control system 7 5 
SPC 
implement 1 3 2 10 
Plate height H= 7 unadjusted machine 5 2 
Preventive 
maintenance 2 3 2 7 
Separator roll 
position H> 5 
Operator 
fault 1 3 Training 3 1 2 2 
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Operator 
fault 7 3 Automation 4 1 2 20 
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supplied 
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7 2 Input 
control 6 2 1 4 
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fault 4 2 Training  7 1 2 2 
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Plate levelling H= 7 Operator fault 6 3 
Extra 
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machine 5 2 
Preventive 
maintenance 10 2 2 7 
Plate batches 
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Operator 
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operators 
11 2 2 6 
3 
Wrong punch H> 7 unadjusted machine 1 2 
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unadjusted 
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maintenance 13 2 2 7 
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is modified in Eq. 10 for considering three parameters in their 
original scale. In fact, the OFI could be equivalent with the 
RPN value which lies in the interval of 1 to 1000. Therefore, 
the RPN has been extended so that each component, 
subsystem, and system can have an RPN value. 
OFI = 10 × 
 001U
z|1           (10) 
As a result, the u-function has been developed for each 
failure mode of the case based on Eq. 9. Hence, the OFI value 
is computed for each process as is presented in Table 4. As 
can be seen, the computed OFI value for process 5 is equal 
with the RPN value of FI  (8×7×3) due to having just one 
failure mode. 
TABLE 4.  
OFI OF EACH PROCESS 
Process 1 2 3 4 5 6 
OFI 299.95 250 77 260 168 114 
To reach the OFI value of the whole system, in subsystem 1 
branch I, there are two components (1 and 2) which are 
connected in a series structure. After that, two branches of 
subsystem 1 are working in parallel. However, they do not 
have the properties of parallel systems in RBDs because the 
next block needs the output of both branches. In other word, 
two branches are connected in a 2-out-of-2 system structure. A 
k-out-of-n system works if and only if at least k components 
work, whereas a parallel system works while at least one 
component works. An n-out-of-n system is a series system, 
and a 1-out-of-n system is a parallel system [36, 37]. 
Consequently, two branches behave as a series system. In 
subsystem 2, three components are connected in as a series 
structure. By considering the mentioned system structure, the 
OFI value of the manufacturing line has been obtained. The 
OFI for subsystem 1, subsystem 2, and system are 322.17, 
290.33, and 336.19 respectively. 
After finding the system’s OFI value, ∆OFI of each 
corrective action based on its improvement on occurrence and 
detection parameters can be calculated. Therefore, ∆OFI is 
useful for ranking the corrective actions in order to 
implementation. Table 5 shows the obtained ∆OFIs and their 
ranking. Also, a comparison is provided with the conventional 
RPN method in Table 5. 
TABLE 5.  
PRIORITIZATION RESULTS 
Action ΔOFIO Ranking ∆OFI Failure mode RPN Ranking RPN 
1 32.23 1 H 245 1 
2 0.00006 15 H= 70 12 
3 0.00005 16 H> 15 17 
4 0.0012 10 H< 105 8 
5 0.017 6 HI 126 5 
6 0.0003 12 HJ 98 11 
7 0.00003 17 HK 32 15 
8 0.0169 7 H= 126 5 
9 2.83 3 H== 196 3 
10 0.00009 13 H>= 70 12 
11 0.0081 9 H<= 100 10 
12 0.00001 18 H> 14 18 
13 0.00009 13 H=> 70 12 
14 0.1321 5 H< 120 7 
15 11.23 2 H=< 224 2 
16 0.31 4 HI 168 4 
17 0.0005 11 HJ 18 16 
18 0.0113 8 H=J 105 8 
The actions have been prioritized in terms of their impact 
on mitigating OFI of the system. The associated actions of the 
high risk failure modes with higher RPN values (i.e. actions 1, 
15, 9, and 16) reach the higher places in ranking because they 
improve occurring rate and detection of the high risk failures. 
However, ∆OFI presents different ranking order for other 
actions in comparison with the RPN. For example, action 14 
stands on the fifth level while its equivalent failure mode (F<) 
was in the 7th place by RPN. The main difference of these 
methods is that RPN ranks the failure modes, but ∆OFI 
prioritizes the corrective actions. The ∆OFI method finds 
which corrective action should be applied in terms of their 
impact on improving the failure behavior of the whole system. 
Therefore, the proposed ∆OFI not only evaluates the 
importance of the failure mode, but also checks whether the 
allocated actions are appropriate to reduce system failure. 
Also, one of the shortcomings of the conventional RPN is that 
it generates many duplicate numbers for ranking the failures 
[19, 26, 35, 38], ∆OFI has the lower duplication rate due to 
having more parameters involved. There are just two 
corrective actions with the same ∆OFI value which are in the 
13th level, however, some repetitive values for RPN can be 
found such as 70, 105, and 126. Therefore, RPN cannot rank 
seven different failure modes properly.  
As can be seen in Table 3, the corrective actions are 
associated with the cost. Particularly, the higher the actions’ 
priority, the higher the cost is assigned. Therefore, a budget 
limitation (B) as 74 has been considered through optimization 
models. The simplex linear programming model which is 
introduced in Eq. 7 is constructed by the obtained ∆OFI values 
and cost information. It has been solved by the Excel solver, 
and the results of the optimal selection are presented in Table 
6. 
TABLE 6.  
OPTIMAL RESULTS OF LINEAR MODEL 
Actions 
∆OFI Cost P P= P> P< PI PJ PK PQ PR P P P= P> P< PI PJ PK PQ
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 142.36 74 
In the optimal solution, 7 corrective actions have been 
selected and the entire budget is consumed. For the non-linear 
objective function which is introduced in Eq. 8, a Matlab 
programming has been developed. Also, a penalty function 
approach has been considered to deal with the budget 
constraint. Penalty functions turn constrained problems into 
unconstrained problem by penalizing infeasible solutions [39]. 
In our work, the penalty-based method proposed in [40] is 
used to define the feasible solutions. Finally, the model is 
solved by genetic algorithm (GA) which the results are shown 
in Table 7. 
TABLE 7.  
OPTIMAL RESULTS OF NON-LINEAR MODEL 
Actions 
∆OFI Cost P P= P> P< PI PJ PK PQ PR P P P= P> P< PI PJ PK PQ
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 142.36 74 
In the optimal solution, the same corrective actions have 
been selected. The optimization model works to find which 
actions and how many should be taken. As can be seen, both 
models reach to similar optimal selection. 
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Discussion 
We would like to investigate scenarios with different budget 
levels. Therefore, the models have been solved through a 
decrease in budget (B=37) and an increase in budget (B=112) 
which Table 8 shows the results. 
TABLE 8.  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Model Budget Actions ∆OFI CostPP= P> P<PI PJ PKPQPR PPP= P>P<PI PJPKPQ 
Linear 37 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 69.85 37 112 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 184.75 111 
Nonlinear 
37 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 71.13 36 
112 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 184.84 111 
As it was expected by growing the budget the number of 
selected actions and the ∆OFI has been increased and vice 
versa. To compare the two models, the nonlinear model finds 
better optimal selection in budget limitation of 37 through the 
same number of actions with lower cost. In budget constraint 
of 112, the nonlinear model reaches to the higher objective 
function with more corrective actions. As a result, the 
nonlinear model works stronger than the linear model to find 
the optimal selection. However, the linear model could be 
more practical due to its simplicity and exactness. 
In addition, the situation that a failure mode has an 
occurrence value of 10 is investigated. Since the occurrence 
rate is obtained via dividing on 10, the occurrence rate of this 
failure is equal to 1. It causes that the behavior of the related 
component be shown as a failed component. For example, if 
the occurrence value of F becomes 10, the proposed method 
finds that there is not the state of ‘no failure’ for packaging 
process. It is reasonable because the failure is almost 
inevitable when the occurrence value is 10. Therefore, this 
situation is crucial, and the occurrence rate must be reduced 
with the highest priority. It is recommended to use parallel 
structure for the component or sub-process to diminish the 
occurrence rate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this study, a new method is proposed to model the system 
failure behavior using qualitative data. The proposed method 
helps practitioners to perform system evaluation in terms of 
risk and reliability when enough data is not accessible. The 
practitioners can utilize experts’ judgements using FMECA to 
investigate system reliability via the proposed method which 
makes a simpler procedure. The UGF approach propagates the 
obtained qualitative data from failure mode levels to system 
levels. The three main goals of this study are (i) integration 
uncertainty in system reliability evaluation using linguistic 
expression when there is not sufficient statistical data, (ii) 
prioritization the corrective action in terms of their impact on 
the whole system failure, (iii) considering actions’ cost in 
order to select the optimal combination of corrective actions 
for implementation. Therefore, an index has been developed 
named OFI to represent the failure behavior of the system 
using FMECA’s parameters. Furthermore, two optimization 
models are proposed to find the optimal selection of corrective 
actions subject to the budget constraint. Finally, a real case 
study on the manufacturing line of the car battery factory is 
presented. The proposed method is applied on the mentioned 
case step by step. The performance of the proposed method is 
compared with the conventional RPN method, and the results 
are discussed. Two optimization models have been compared 
based on the obtained results. Also, a crucial situation of 
having a failure mode with occurrence value of 10 is 
introduced, and it is suggested to improve it with the highest 
priority based on the proposed method. For further research, 
fuzzy logic can be integrated in the proposed method. 
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